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Research highlights 
1. Traditional authorities maintain complete power over allocation of land. 
2. Their control over collective grazing of rangeland is ineffective.  
3. Some sectors of the community resist traditional authority. 
4. Civil society institutions also exist but only to facilitate community 
development. 










The South African government has endeavoured to strengthen property rights in 
communal areas and develop civil society institutions for community-led development 
and natural resource management.  However, the effectiveness of this remains unclear 
as the emergence and operation civil society institutions in these areas is potentially 
constrained by the persistence of traditional authorities.  Focusing on the former 
Transkei region of Eastern Cape Province, three case study communities are used 
examine the extent to which local institutions overlap in issues of land access and 
control.   
 
Within these communities traditional leaders (chiefs and headmen) continue to exercise 
complete and sole authority over land allocation and use this to entrench their own 
positions.  However, in the absence of effective state support, traditional authorities 
have only limited power over how land is used and in enforcing land rights, particularly 
over communal resources such as rangeland.  This diminishes their local legitimacy and 
encourages some groups to contest their authority by cutting fences, ignoring collective 
grazing decisions and refusing to pay „fees‟ levied on them.  They are encouraged in 
such activities by the presence of democratically elected local civil society institutions 
such as ward councillors and farmers‟ organisations, which have broad appeal and are 
increasingly responsible for much of the agrarian development that takes place, despite 
having no direct mandate over land.  Where it occurs at all, interaction between these 
different institutions is generally restricted to approval being required from traditional 
leaders for land allocated to development projects.  On this basis it is argued that a 
more radical approach to land reform in communal areas is required, which transfers all 
powers over land to elected and accountable local institutions and integrates land 
allocation, land management and agrarian development more effectively. 
 
Key words: Communal land, rangeland, local institutions, land access, land control, 
accountability. 
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1.1. Theoretical context and key debates 
 
Considerable debate currently surrounds appropriate mechanisms for securing and 
strengthening land rights in developing countries (Toulmin and Quan, 2000; Sjaastad 
and Cousins, 2008; Loehr, 2012).  Political economists such as de Soto (2000), have 
espoused the formalisation of property rights through titling as the only effective means 
of securing capital in order to reduce poverty.  In contrast, many other academics, as 
well as land law practioners, have expressed considerable scepticism about this 
approach, suggesting that there is much empirical evidence to suggest previous 
attempts at titling have not yielded the economic or tenure security benefits intended 
(Quan, 2000a; Alden Wily, 2008; Bromley, 2008).   
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, many countries have been actively encouraged, by pervasive 
neo-liberal theory and in many cases the jurisitic legacy of their colonial forbears, to 
eschew a role for customary tenure in developing modern land tenure systems 
(Sjaastad and Cousins, 2008; Obeng-Odoom, 2012).  However, there is now increasing 
recognition amongst academics, land rights activists and land NGOs of the social and 
political „embeddedness‟ of land rights in Africa, and how this needs to be reflected in 
contemporary land tenure frameworks (Cousins, 2007, 2008, 2010; Lavigne Delville, 
2007; Okoth-Ogendo, 1989, 2008).  In particular Okoth-Ogendo has argued that social 
relations „….create a set of reciprocal rights and obligations that bind together and vest 
power in community members over land.‟ (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008: 100).   
 
An important part of this is a conceptual distinction between land access and control.  In 
this line of argument, land access is essentially a function of membership in the family 
or community and is available to any individual on this basis, although with certain 
limitations on the rights of women to hold land in their own right (Walker, 2003; Bank 
and Mabhena, 2011).  It is always specific to a resource management or production 
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function or group of functions and is maintained through active participation in the 
production process at particular levels of social organisation (Peters 1994).  Control 
over and management of land is vested in and exercised by the political authority of a 
particular social group to supervise specific functions at different levels of social 
organisation (Bromley and Cernea,1989).  It acts to guarantee power over access to 
land for production purposes (Okoth-Ogendo, 1989). These principles provide a basic 
framework for understanding how land tenure systems have functioned historically in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
What this formulation of land tenure does, however, is set up a tension in the design of 
effective national land tenure policies that both embed rights and uphold democratic 
principles.  Of particular focus has been the role and nature of local institutions in the 
securing of land rights (Toulmin, 2000; Agrawal, 2001; Toulmin, 2008).  Nested, local 
institutions play a key role in a decentralised process of securing land rights for local 
people and have historically been the crux of land access and control for many 
communities (Alden-Wily, 2003; Toulmin et al., 2004; Toulmin, 2008).  However, given 
the profound socio-economic and political changes that have taken place and the 
degree of manipulation they have been subject to by colonial and post-independence 
administrations, the form that current institutions take and the extent to which they are 
able to uphold and administer a socially and politically embedded view of customary 
land rights is highly variable (Coutula, 2007).  For example, in many parts of rural West 
Africa customary institutions of varying form still govern access to land and natural 
resources (Lavigne Delville, 2007) whereas in Botswana the role of customary 
authorities (chiefs) in land allocation has, since 1970, been replaced by that of putatively 
more accountable Land Boards (Alden Wily, 2003; Quan 2000b).   
 
Where customary authorities still play an active role in land management, the degree of 
legitimacy and perceived accountability that they have amongst local people is a further 
pressing concern.  Under colonial administrations, traditional leaders in many countries, 
particularly in Anglophone Africa, became paid appointees of the state with a devolved 
mandate over local law and administration; a system that Mamdani (1996) has 
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described as „decentralized despotism‟.  Most aspects of judicial, legislative and 
administrative power, including comprehensive powers over local land allocation and 
control, became embodied in them, creating a „clenched fist‟ of local authority 
(Mamdani, 1996: 23).  This unassailable authority encouraged arrogance and corruption 
such that these traditional leaders often lost the grassroots support of the majority of 
people they purported to represent (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2011; Cousins, 2008; 
Delius, 2008).  Evidence of this lack of popular support for customary authorities as a 
result of perceived corruption and a lack of downward accountability continues to 
accumulate from many parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Peters, 2004; Kinsey 2005; Thiaw 
and Ribot, 2005; Cotula, 2007).  For these reasons, the continuing power of customary 
authorities in relation to land administration remains strongly contested, with some 
commentators holding that in democratic states, a legitimate role for them in matters of 
such critical importance to local people is no longer justified (Ntsebeza, 2005).  The 
situation is made more uncertain for local people in some countries in that new local 
government structures now co-exist with customary authorities at the grassroots level 
(e.g. see Cotula and Cisse, 2007 for Mali; Spierenburg, 2005 for Zimbabwe; Ntsebeza, 
2008 for South Africa).  This „institutional layering‟ has resulted in clashes, sometimes 
violent, which often have at their core struggles to exercise control over land allocation 
and management (Peires, 2000; Kinsey, 2005).   
 
1.2. The South African situation 
 
South Africa offers a case in point.  Here, the social embeddedness of land rights in the 
pre-colonial era, through membership of a politically autonomous group within a 
chiefdom, has been well documented (Peires, 1981; Beinart, 1982; Delius, 2008).  So 
too has the increasingly decentralised and authoritarian approach to land access and 
control by traditional authorities that was imposed during the colonial and apartheid eras 
(Ntsebeza, 2005; Oomen, 2005; Delius 2008).  In the post-apartheid era, the removal of 
much of the state apparatus supporting traditional governance structures within former 
homeland areas and the contraction of agricultural extension services, has created 
considerable uncertainty regarding land tenure and land management.  The 
5 
 
development of democratically elected and locally accountable Transitional Rural 
Councils (TRCs) initially gave hope to many rural people that these structures would not 
only play a role in service provision but also take the lead in land allocation and 
management (Peires, 2000). However following local government elections in 2000, 
these councils were subsumed under local municipalities that formally merged rural 
councils and their better organised urban equivalents, thereby effectively leaving 
contentious land allocation and management issues unresolved (Ntsebeza, 2011).  A 
decentralised approach to land rights in rural areas was also supported by legislation 
such as the Communal Property Association Act (Republic of South Africa, 1996), which 
enabled local communities in rural areas to create accountable communal property 
associations (CPAs) to strengthen property rights and facilitate local resource 
management (Cousins and Hornby, 2002; Wotshela, 2011).  However, given that the 
apartheid laws governing land allocation had not been repealed, in many areas 
traditional authorities successfully resisted attempts to devolve their power over land 
access and control (Lahiff, 2003; Ntsebeza, 2008).   
 
In communal areas, the lack of adequate tenure reform has been highlighted as a key 
shortcoming in securing land rights, reducing conflict and promoting agrarian 
development (Lahiff, 2008; Cousins, 2010). The Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA), 
introduced in 2004, was designed to end this uncertainty by transferring title of 
communal land to nebulous „communities‟, nominally represented by a land 
administration committee.  In principal, communities could choose whether this 
committee was to be democratically elected or whether an exsiting traditional council 
should assume this role.  However, amidst fears by land activists that CLARA afforded 
too much opportunity for unelected traditional authorities to cement their control over 
local land rights, the Act was contested in the Constitutional Court, declared 
unconstitutional in 2010 and must now be fundamentally reconsidered (Bank and 
Mabhena, 2011).   
 
Although this undoubtedly represents a blow to the ambitions of traditional authorities in 
South Africa, their position is still strong, being legally underpinned by the Traditional 
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Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA), enacted in 2003.  This Act was 
closely linked to CLARA and created a framework for provincial laws which would define 
the status and powers of traditional leaders, as well as enabling apartheid era tribal 
authorities to be considered as traditional councils (Claassens, 2008).  Thus, despite 
the setback with CLARA, a legal platform has been created to enable traditional 
authorities to play an increasingly important role in local administration in communal 
areas.  The fact that senior members of the House of Traditional Leaders have come to 
hold influential positions in the African National Congress (ANC), has also led to a new 
assertiveness among the chieftancy in some regions of the country, resulting in 
widespread controversy and local conflict (Ntsebeza, 2005; Oomen, 2000, 2005).  Thus, 
the issue of overall control over land in communal areas – land and rural resources 
which offer an important livelihood stream to many rural households - remains highly 
contentious. 
 
This institutional uncertainty and variation over land access and control is particularly 
marked in Eastern Cape Province.  In this regard, there is a distinction between the 
former Ciskei and Transkei bantustans. Since 1990, the communal areas of the former 
Ciskei bantustan, an area where chiefs have been historically weaker, have a track 
record of engaging with democratic bodies of community governance (Manona, 1997). 
Rural communities here have established CPAs for natural resource ownership and 
management (e.g. Bennett et al., 2010; Wotshela, 2011).  In contrast, in the former 
bantustan of Transkei, land access and management continues to have a far more 
traditional basis being administered largely through local chiefs and their headmen and 
associated committees (Lahiff, 2003; Ntsebeza, 2005). However, the strong association 
of these traditional authorities with the previous apartheid system and a legacy of 
favouritism and frequently corrupt land administration practices, have led many to 
question their continued legitimacy within a democratic South Africa (Claassens, 2008; 
Ntsebeza, 2008).   
 
The resurgence of traditional authorities raises some important questions about current 
systems of land access and management within rural areas such as the Transkei.  To 
7 
 
what extent have CPAs or other local governance structures have emerged in the 
contested politics of the post-1994 period and what roles (if any) do they play in land 
management?  Do these roles overlap with those of existing traditional authorities and, 
if so, how these institutions co-exist?  How do local people perceive the relative 
effectiveness of local institutions in governing access to and control over land and 
resources?  Lastly, what local legitimacy do these institutions engender, particularly 
over issues of enforcement and dispute resolution in relation to agrarian resources? 
 
Using the former Transkei as a case study, this paper draws on empirical research to 
provide insight into these fundamentally important questions.  Focusing on issues of 
land access and control at both an individual and communal level, it will examine the 
range of institutions currently in place in different communities, the way in which these 
interact with each other and the extent to which they are accountable and to whom.  A 
particular focus will be on how these institutions function in providing access to and 
control over communal rangeland resources, which continue to provide important, 
supplementary livelihood streams and economic security for especially poor people in 
rural parts of the country (Lahiff 2003, Hebinck and Van Averbeke 2007, Shackleton et 
al. 2005). The rapidly evolving institutional arrangements have been documented for 
other areas of the Eastern Cape (e.g. Ainslie, 1999; Bennett and Barrett, 2007) but 
remain unclear for much of the former Transkei (but see Ntsebeza 2005, 2008 on the 
former Xalanga District).  Shedding more light on these matters will be important in 
informing policy debates that are taking place within both South Africa and other African 
states regarding the reform of communal land tenure and the most effective 
mechanisms for rural people to gain access to and sustainably manage „commons‟ 
resources as part of their livelihood strategies.  
 




2.1. Case Study Area 
 
Three communities that are geographically representative of much of the social, 
ecological and political variability that characterises the Transkei region were selected 
as study sites for the research. They are Dudumashe, Nyandeni and Rockcliff (Figure 1) 
and form part of an existing programme of rangeland research led by the Eastern Cape 
Department of Agriculture (ECDA), which commenced in 2006.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
The communities each fall within one of the three district municipalities within the former 
Transkei region, namely Alfred Nzo, Ukhahlamba and O.R. Tambo.  These are the 
worst-resourced district municipalities within Eastern Cape Province and are home to 
the majority of the poorest households (defined as household income less than 800 
Rand per month) in the province (Ruiters, 2011).  These district municipalities are 
further divided into Local municipalities, which have a developmental function, in that 
they are expected to „facilitate‟ local development and bear responsibility for the 
„transformation‟ of municipal services to better serve the poorest (Nel, 2011; Ruiters, 
2011).  However they have a tiny local tax base and insignificant revenue streams and 
thus remain dependent on the disbursement of funds from central (i.e. national) 
government.  These local municipalities in turn consist of a number of wards each 
comprising several villages, with each ward represented by a ward councillor and 
(nascent) ward committee.  The three communities are briefly described in turn. 
 
Dudumashe falls within Ward 17 of Mnquma Local Municipality and also forms part of 
the AmaHlubi Tribal Authority.  The village is said to have been founded by the great 
grandfather of the current headman in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  At this 
time, homesteads were clustered in 10 separate hamlets, scattered around the 
rangeland.  Formal surveying by the colonial authorities and allocation of deeds for 
residential and arable land under a system of quitrent title began around 1905 and the 
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boundaries of these were demarcated by a series of stone beacons (ECDA, n.d.).  In 
1960, the village underwent „Betterment Planning‟, which involved the separate hamlets 
being collectivised into a single residential area and arable land being concentrated into 
five main blocks.  People who were previously landless were allocated arable land and 
an associated residential site under permission to occupy (PTO), an insecure form of 
communal tenure.  Arable land was fenced off from rangeland and the perimeter of the 
rangeland was also fenced and divided internally into four separate camps (Bantu Trust, 
1971).  The fencing was renewed along approximately the same boundaries in 2001, 
when an Integrated Livestock Development Plan (ILDP), focused on increasing wool 
production, was initiated by the Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture (ECDA, 2001).  
The ILDP records the total area of the settlement as 2,390 ha. 
 
Nyandeni village is about 20km north-east of the regional capital Mthatha and some 6 
km from the nearest small town, Libode.  Historically, its origins lie with the arrival of 
King Ndamase of the amaMpondo people in the area, in about 1845.  The original 
settlement consisted of eight scattered hamlets, coalescing around the Chief and his 
council at his Great Place (ECDA, n.d).  These hamlets were semi-autonomous, with 
each having its own Headman who had power over land allocation.  Beyond the 
formalisation of rangeland boundaries and the imposition of a hut tax system, the 
settlement seems to have remained relatively free of colonial interference until about 
1947, when a Soil Reclamation project – the precursor of Betterment Planning - was 
imposed (ECDA, n.d.).  As with Dudumashe, this involved the collectivisation of the 
scattered hamlets into three discrete villages, Nyandeni, Luthubeni and Raini, which 
were collectively called Nyandeni Administrative Area (Department of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 1947).  As part of the same programme, arable land was re-organised into 
discrete areas and allocations were reduced in size, such that households no longer 
had access to more than 4-5 acres and new allocations became available. Rangeland 
was separated from arable land by fencing and divided into 18 separate camps, which 
were shared between the three villages.  The total area of the re-organised 
adminstrative area given in the 1947 plan is 6,768 ha, of which 3,800 ha is rangeland 
(Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 1947).  Politically, within the current structure 
10 
 
of democratic local governance, Nyandeni village forms part of Ward 3, which also 
includes the adjacent villages of Luthubeni, Raini, Tyara, Makhotyana and Mhalanga 
and falls under Nyandeni Local Municipality.  In terms of traditional authority, however, it 
falls under the jurisdiction of Nyandeni Tribal Authority headed by Chief M.N.  His Great 
Place is located close to Nyandeni village.     
 
Rockcliff is the most remote of the three study sites, located close to the border with 
Lesotho, in an area that originally constituted a separate part of Ciskei before its formal 
incorporation into the newly created Transkei homeland in 1976 (Switzer, 1993). The 
village is believed to have been established in the 1860s, without formal title to land, by 
people moving eastwards from Herschel, and remained largely free of government 
planning until the arrival of betterment in 1964 (ECDA, n.d.).  At this point the area was 
restructured politically to become the Pelendaba Tribal Authority through the 
collectivisation of smaller settlements into the three main village clusters of Rockcliff, 
Siphambo and Pelendaba.  Other physical restructuring that occurred included the 
reallocation of arable fields within discrete parcels of arable land, with the associated 
issue of PTO title to landholders, and the fencing of existing rangeland into eight 
separate camps (Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 1964).  The rehabilitation plan 
gives the total area of Rockcliff as 5,235 ha, of which 4015 ha is rangeland (Department 
of Agriculture and Forestry, 1964).   
 
2.2. Data collection 
 
Field research within each of these three sites was undertaken in 2009-10 and adopted 
a qualitative approach.  It began with focus group interviews at each site, involving 10-
15 villagers who grazed livestock on communal rangelands.  Also present in some 
cases were sub-headmen and local livestock extension officers.  The interview format 
made use of a semi-structured, checklist approach (Robson, 2002) to establish in detail 
the nature of the local institutions associated with land access and control and how 
these were understood to operate and perform.  Every effort was made to ensure 
adequate representation of individuals in terms of age and gender in these focus 
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groups.  Subsequently, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with purposively 
selected key informants from each village.  These included people actively involved in 
local civil society institutions, and included ward councillors, leaders of farmers‟ 
associations, and traditional leaders.  The headmen from all three villages were 
interviewed individually but only the ward councillor from Rockcliff was available for 
interview.  Also interviewed were five individuals purposively selected from each focus 
group to provide more personal perspectives on engagement with land access and use.  
All interviews were conducted by the researchers, with responses provided in the local 
Xhosa language and translated into English by a research assistant provided by ECDA 
acting as a translator.  The interview work was complemented by transect walks with 
key informants to identify rangeland boundaries (e.g separate grazing camps and 
community boundaries) and to observe livestock management practices.  In keeping 
with standard ethical procedures, interviewees were made fully aware of how the 
information they provided would be used.  Where responses can be directly attributed to 




Analysis of the primary data collected from each community indicated that a number of 
traditional and civil society structures co-exist at the local level at each community.  
These display varying degrees of power over key activities such as land access, 
allocation and control and the related issues of local development and service provision. 
Consequently, the results are structured to describe the institutional interaction 
associated with both sets of activities.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
3.1. Institutions of land access and control 
 
It was clear from both the focus groups and individual interviews conducted that 
traditional authorities still retain a powerful grip over many aspects of local people‟s 
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lives, particularly land access and control, at all three villages (Table 1).  These are 
hierarchically structured, with a sub-headman (ibothi) being responsible for each village 
section (isiphaluka) within every village and in turn reporting to the headman, as the 
main traditional leader at the village level.  In all three cases, the headmen interviewed 
had inherited their positions through patrilineal descent, rather than been elected to this 
position.  
 
3.1.1. Land allocation and access 
The headmen all concurred that their key roles within their respective areas of 
jurisdiction were the maintenance of law and order and to act as custodians of the land 
on behalf of the chief.  Indeed, they were all careful to point out that they still held power 
over all aspects of local land administration, regardless of what other democratic 
structures now existed.  This was emphasised by the headman at Dudumashe who 
insisted, „….the land is vested in me as part of the lineage established by my great-
grandfather‟ and further corroborated by the Chief at Nyandeni who stated „….the land 
is held in Trust by me on behalf of the community…..the Ward Committee and Ward 
Councillor can have no role in deciding matters of land allocation or management.‟  This 
authority empowers them to issue title to residential land.  The basic process of issuing 
these rights to land appears to have changed little since apartheid times.  It involves the 
applicant(s) appearing before a village meeting (imbizo) presided over by the headman 
to approve the site allocation which, if agreed upon, is referred to the Local Agricultural 
Office (LAO) to be formalised.  However, this no longer involves a formal land survey 
being undertaken or the issue of paper title deeds.  Rather security of land rights is 
provided locally through the approval given by the community and officially through 
registration of the allocation by the Headman at the LAO.  This represents a significant 
informalisation compared to what went before, which potentially makes the role of the 
Headmen more important in resolving future land-related disputes. 
 
Access to arable land is no longer provided as part of the issue of title at any of the 
villages, mainly due to the dearth of available plots.  Rather, individuals make 
arrangements with each other to borrow currently unused arable fields for cultivation, if 
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required.  At Dudumashe, the headman acts as a guarantor for these arrangements but 
in general traditional leaders are not involved unless there is a dispute that requires 
resolution.  Several such agreements were in place amongst the villagers interviewed at 
Dudumashe, as a shortage of arable land has been a problem there for some time.  At 
Nyandeni, even though new arable allocations are not available, there is little interest in 
such agreements as arable production rights are insecure (see section 3.1.2).  Rather, 
those people who continue to engage with crop production do so either in small home 
gardens within their residential site, or on a collective basis in designated community 
gardens.  At Rockcliff, almost all individuals have access to their own arable plots and in 
most cases these are fenced.   
 
At all three research sites, rights of access to communal rangeland (primarily for 
grazing) are guaranteed through membership of that community.  Where communities 
consist of several villages (i.e. at Nyandeni and Rockcliff) rights of access to separate 
rangeland areas are officially defined by village.  For example at Nyandeni, each village 
historically had access to six of the 18 separate rangeland camps.  Currently, however, 
all villages at Nyandeni effectively have access to all camps due to problems with 
enforcement stemming from the lack of fencing (see section 3.1.2).  This is exacerbated 
by instances of rangeland encroachment by those outside the community, making the 
management of rangelands difficult due to the inability of local resource managers to 
enforce boundaries.   
 
The traditional leaders at the villages also play a key role in the allocation of land for 
development purposes.  In this regard, the level of involvement of civil society actors in 
this process differs considerably between the villages.  At Dudumashe the headman 
ensures that no other local actors are involved in these processes.  This is exemplified 
by the implementation of the ILDP in 2001, which involved the headman, who chairs the 
village‟s Wool Growers Association (WGA), interacting directly with the National Wool 
Growers‟ Association (NWGA) and the local municipality.  Other relevant village-level 
actors from local government such as the ward councillor were entirely by-passed in the 
„delivery‟ of this project.  Indeed, the political impasse between the headman and the 
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current ward councillor severely constrains service delivery (see Section 3.2 for further 
discussion).  In contrast, at both Nyandeni and Rockcliff, local actors such as the ward 
councillor are actively involved in brokering projects requiring land, although the ultimate 
decision regarding the allocation of the land still rests with the traditional leader.  At 
Rockcliff the process involves the headman as well as the local ward councillor and 
representatives of farmers‟ groups.  It begins with a request for a particular project (e.g. 
rezoning and fencing of rangeland camps) being made by the local community to the 
ward councillor who takes this to the ward committee from where it is transmitted to the 
local municipality in order to seek funding.  The decision is then transmitted back to the 
local community and, if necessary, the headman seeks approval from the chief for the 
allocation of land (see Figure 2 and further discussion in section 4.1).  At Nyandeni the 
process involves separate letters being written by the headman, ward councillor and 
chair of the relevant local civic group, to the local municipality in support of the project.  
For particularly important projects the entire ward council may meet with the paramount 
chief at his great place in order to discuss the allocation of a parcel of land in 
furtherance of the project. 
 
3.1.2. Control over land  
In all three communities, natural resource management remains under the control of the 
headman and associated land committee, as it was under apartheid-era bantustan 
administrations.  Focus groups revealed that until the 1980s most rangeland 
management practices were strictly controlled by the bantustan regime.  For example, 
decisions on the rotational resting and grazing of rangeland camps were taken by the 
District Agricultural Office, ratified by the local magistrate and communicated to the 
headman at each village.  The headman was then responsible for communicating these 
decisions to the people through an imbizo.  A ranger was appointed by government 
from each community to ensure compliance with this and any livestock found in rested 
camps or in the arable lands during the growing season would be impounded and the 
owners fined.  Although the stringency of these measures declined over the course of 
the 1980s, the magistrate was the central figure in coordinating and ensuring 
compliance with these communal grazing decisions.  Likewise, the decision to open the 
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arable land allocations to grazing after cropping, whilst made by a community imbizo, 
had to be communicated to the magistrate.  Currently, however, there are highly 
variable attempts at collective management of rangeland by the three communities and 
the district magistrate is no longer a lynchpin of the system. 
 
The most ineffective grazing management occurs at Nyandeni.  Here the poor state of 
the remaining fencing means that even historical boundaries with neighbouring 
communities can no longer be enforced and livestock from surrounding areas gain 
access to Nyandeni‟s rangeland and vice-versa in an „open access‟ situation.  Likewise, 
poor perimeter fencing allows stock access to the arable fields throughout the year.  
This is a major disincentive to the cultivation of these fields by owners and the main 
reason why few people seek to make use of them any longer.  In effect, most blocks of 
arable land now constitute a permanent extension of the rangeland.  In this 
environment, the traditional authorities make no attempt to impose any form of rotational 
grazing or resting regimes, even though not to do so represents a significant breakdown 
in recognised land rights at the village.  It was clear from the Nyandeni focus group that 
many of the older people were very concerned about this loss of control and advocated 
the reinstatement of fencing.  However, most young people showed little concern and 
preferred the unregulated environment which currently prevails.  Indeed, several were 
actually against the use of fencing from a practical perspective as it made collection of 
cattle from the rangeland more arduous.    
 
At Dudumashe the instigation of the ILDP in 2001 and the associated re-instatement of 
fencing, enables much more effective control over livestock grazing.  The perimeter 
fencing of the rangeland is secure in most sections and prevents encroachment of stock 
from outside the village.  The exception is the fencing which borders the adjacent village 
of Nomaheya, which has not been replaced and allows the adjacent camp to be 
regularly encroached by unsupervised livestock.  Stray animals from neighbouring 
settlements are impounded and the headman will invite the owners to an imbizo to 
settle the dispute.  This will usually involve the owners receiving a warning initially, but 
fines may be levied in cases of repeated offences.  Despite the presence of individual, 
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fenced camps at Dudumashe, no attempt is made at rotational resting or grazing of 
different sections of the rangeland.  This was corroborated by individual farmers, all of 
whom related that they generally grazed their livestock in the camp nearest to their 
residential site and could move their animals to other camps at will.  However, decisions 
about the opening of arable land allocations for grazing after harvesting of crops are 
taken collectively by farmers themselves, often in small groups, although the decision 
about the closing of the arable lands to livestock is made as part of a community imbizo.   
 
Since the reinstatement of fencing under the ILDP, the village has also employed a 
ranger to check the quality of the fencing and to remove any encroaching stock from 
outside the settlement.  The ranger, who also happens to be a relative of the headman, 
is paid a salary of 400 Rand/month, which is covered by collecting ten Rand/month from 
every household at the village.  According to one informant, the requirement for all 
households to contribute, even those without stock, is that everybody consumes meat 
when an animal is slaughtered in the village as part of a traditional ceremony.  
Moreover, this levy generates a surplus each month which the headman accumulates in 
order to invest in village improvements.  For example, the recent construction of a 
creche for pre-school children was paid for through this fund.   Despite this, it is clear 
that a significant minority of households refuse to pay these ranger fees. In an effort to 
enforce compliance, the headman explained that he keeps a list of all the people who 
do not pay.  He will force these individuals to pay a fee of five Rand each time they 
need documentation from him with which to attest to their status as bona-fide residents 
of the village.  The imposition of this fee has clearly generated strong resentment 
among the non-payers and deepened political divisions in the village. 
 
Under the direction of the grazing committee, a system of grazing management still 
officially operates at Rockcliff.  According to the headman, this involves two of the eight 
camps being rested for an entire year and two being rested for six months during the 
dry season, whilst the remainder are grazed on a one-month rotational basis. This is a 
direct perpetuation of the previous apartheid grazing system.  After a meeting of the 
grazing committee, the headman communicates the decision on camp closure to the 
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community through an imbizo to secure broad approval.  However, the livestock farmers 
interviewed related that in practice the generally poor quality of the fencing makes 
compliance with the rotational grazing system difficult to enforce.  Livestock frequently 
gain access to the rested camps and without an appointed ranger at the village, it is up 
to owners to remove them.  Whilst many are prepared to do this, some graze their cattle 
wherever they please.  One livestock owner interviewed felt this was justified because 
„..all the camp fencing is gone and…animals effectively wander everywhere now‟.   
 
Interestingly, it was suggested during the focus group that some individuals deliberately 
refuse to follow the traditional grazing rules because they want to demonstrate their lack 
of support for the old structures of governance and their belief that new civil society 
structures such as the ward council should exercise more power in these matters.  
However, when interviewed separately, the ward councillor was keen to distance 
himself from the suggestion of an antagonistic relationship between the ward council 
and traditional authority.  He suggested that such actions were motivated more by some 
individuals behaving selfishly and not wanting to follow the rules for their own 
convenience, rather than any attempt to make a political statement.  The sanction for 
transgressing the agreed grazing rules is impoundment of livestock and a fine of five 
Rand for each animal grazing in the wrong camp in the short-term rotation or ten Rand 
for the camps under longer-term rest.  Nevertheless, several members of the focus 
group clearly felt that this system was unfair.  Some believed that it was unevenly 
applied, such that key figures in the village affiliated to groups such as the grazing 
committee or wool growers were able to persistently flout the grazing rules and avoid 
punitive action.  How much of this genuinely results from nepotism rather than the 
limited capacity in the absence of a ranger to identify instances of rule-breaking, was 
difficult to establish definitively. It was also noted that there was a lack of transparency 
in what happened to the fines after they were collected.  According to the headman, 20 
percent of the money was transferred to the Council of Traditional Leaders and the 
remainder was spent in the community on tasks such as the repair of fencing.  
However, the impression amongst some of those interviewed was that most of the 
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money went to the traditional leaders and little or nothing went directly to the 
community.   
 
Control over arable land at Rockcliff is mainly exercised at the individual level.  The 
presence of fencing around many arable plots enables owners to have secure rights 
over crop production during the growing season and also guarantees exclusive access 
by their livestock to the crop stubble during the dry season.  It gives these individuals 
the autonomy to begin planting and also to open their fields to grazing whenever they 
wish, should they choose to do so.  According to the headman, such actions are 
legitimate and the prerogative of the field owner.  However, some members of the focus 
group suggested that the opening and closing of the arable land allocations should be a 
collective decision taken by the entire community under the guidance of the grazing 
committee and that everybody in the community should adhere to these decisions.     
 
3.2. Institutions for agricultural development and service provision 
 
In addition to traditional authorities, a number of civil society institutions are responsible 
for facilitating important land-based activities such as agricultural development and 
service provision at each village.  The two main civil society groups involved in this are 
farmers‟ organisations and ward councillors.  It is important to understand their structure 
and function as it highlights the variable degree of autonomy and power these 
groupings exercise in facilitating agrarian development.      
 
3.2.1. Farmers’ Organisations 
The number of farmers‟ organisations operating at each community varied considerably. 
Dudumashe represents the simplest case with the WGA being the dominant producer 
group at the village.  Membership of the WGA at Dudumashe involves payment of an 
annual fee plus an additional fee for the shearing of each animal.  The headman is the 
chairman and acts as a direct link to the NWGA, which has enabled delivery of the ILDP 
at Dudumashe as well as the construction of shearing sheds and provision of additional 
equipment for the shearing and baling of wool.  Nevertheless, the control of the WGA by 
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the Headman has resulted in the emergence of a rival group of wool producers at the 
village called UK/USA.  This splinter group, although much smaller than the WGA, 
operates with a similar fee-paying membership.  However, as a rival group, its members 
are prevented from using the shearing sheds and instead shear their animals at their 
own homesteads and make independent arrangements to sell their wool.  The group is 
chaired by the half-brother of the Headman/chairman, who was involved in a power-
struggle with the current chairman over leadership of Dudumashe during the early 
1990s.   
 
At Nyandeni a complex hierarchy of farmers‟ organisations exists.  This begins at the 
village level with the existence of numerous individual projects focused, for example, on 
poultry and vegetable production.  Each of these has its own membership, which feeds 
into community level organisations such as the WGA and Nyandeni Trust, which is the 
organisation responsible for poultry and vegetable production at Nyandeni.  These in 
turn feed into an overall „umbrella‟ organisation called the Libode Farmers‟ Organisation 
(LFO).  LFO has membership from 23 separate villages making it representative of 
much of the Nyandeni local municipality.  Each local producer group has to pay a joining 
fee of 150 Rand to become registered with LFO.  However, the general consensus from 
the focus group at Nyandeni was that this affiliation brings considerable benefits.  The 
hierarchy of LFO meets in the small town of Libode and has representation on the local 
municipality, which is also based there.  As such it is able to secure funding for different 
producer groups, which „cascades down‟ to local projects at the village level.  It also 
acts as a forum for the dissemination of new ideas and projects between communities.   
 
At Rockcliff there is similar grassroots representation of local farmers‟ organisations 
from each village.  Five producer groups exist at each village within Pelendaba, namely 
the Wool Growers Association, Crop and Garden Association, Red Meat Producers, 
Orchards Association and Poultry and Piggery Association.  At each village there is also 
a farmers‟ association, which represents these different producer groups.  Each 
farmers‟ association is headed by a committee comprising seven elected individuals 
including one representative from each producer group, a secretary and chairman.  The 
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role of these farmers‟ associations is to establish the collective needs of the separate 
producer groups they represent and to articulate these at community meetings, when 
farmers from across all of Pelendaba are called together by the headman in his role as 
deputy chief.  The forum for discussing specific development initiatives is the Land Use 
and Development Committee (LUDC), which is effectively a bridge between the 
community and local government, chaired by the headman.  This is elaborated in Figure 
2 and the overview of this institutional interaction provided in section 4.1. 
 
3.2.2. Ward councillors 
In Dudumashe, the local municipal ward councillor was unwilling to be interviewed.  Key 
informants related that she is a resident of the village but has failed to form a working 
relationship with the headman.  The headman appears to be unwilling to engage with 
her until she formally presents herself to the village as part of a community meeting 
presided over by him.  Until this issue is resolved it is clear that this avenue for 
development at Dudumashe will remain effectively closed and the headman will 
continue to make representations directly to outside organisations to achieve this, 
thereby capturing the kudos for successful development interventions.  At Nyandeni the 
ward councillor was never available for interview when contacted, although it was 
indicated that he played a fairly active role in brokering local development.  
 
An interview was obtained with the ward councillor from Rockcliff.  He stated that his 
main role was to bring services to the local communities, primarily water, sanitation, 
electricity and access roads.  He chairs the ward committee which meets to discuss the 
community development needs expressed by each village through a local imbizo.  
Despite a fairly positive working relationship with the headman at Rockcliff, he felt this 
had occasionally been compromised by the headman‟s tendency to take complete 
credit within the community for some of the development initiatives the councillor had 
been instrumental in facilitating.  The main issue that currently causes difficulty in 
project delivery is the lack of congruence between the boundaries of the old Tribal 
Authorities and the new ward structures.  For example, within Pelendaba TA the villages 
of Siphambo and Rockcliff fall within one ward, whereas Pelendaba village falls within a 
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separate ward.  Thus, the councillor (who has responsibility for seven villages within his 
ward) has to deal with several different headmen when negotiating over land access. 
For his part, the headman at Rockcliff (as the deputy chief of Pelendaba Tribal 




4.1. Institutional layering 
  
The case study villages are representative of the considerable layering of traditional and 
civil society institutions that currently pertains in the former Transkei.  This complexity 
plays out in different ways in communities resulting in a variety of scenarios ranging 
from the perpetuation of traditional authority hegemony with almost no involvement of 
civil society actors (as in Dudumashe), to the co-existence of both sets of institutions 
with varying levels of interaction between them (in Rockcliff).  
 
Dudumashe is in fact something of an anachronism, having developed very little in an 
institutional sense since the formal end of apartheid.  It remains firmly under the 
jurisdiction of single authoritarian, traditional leader, who carefully controls all day-to-day 
aspects of village function and attempts to perpetuate the old system and his own 
hegemony.  The only formal civil society structure which is active in the community is 
the WGA and this too is under his under his control.  There is no interaction between 
the headman and other village level civil society actors who would normally be present 
such as the ward councillor or agricultural extension officer.  As a result of this refusal to 
engage with these new structures, the headman is now responsible not only for land 
and resource management activities within the village but also for facilitating externally-
driven development such as provision of local infrastructure.  The only way he can 
achieve this is by interacting directly with external organisations such as the local 
agricultural office and local municipality – effectively taking the place of the ward 
councillor – and by organising small-scale projects within the village using internally 
derived revenue.  His intransigence has also had the effect of promoting the 
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development of informal politicised splinter groups within the community, such as 
UK/USA.    
 
Nyandeni has much more civil society involvement than Dudumashe.  Farmers‟ 
associations are widespread and strong. Indeed, these seem to represent the mainstay 
of agrarian development at the village through their links with external umbrella 
organisations such as the LFO.  Despite this, the headmen and chief remain solely 
responsible for land access and control at the village. Development projects that require 
an allocation of land depend on the support of the community, the ward councillor, and 
traditional authorities but with ultimate sanctioning by the chief.  However, interaction 
between these different groups seems to be limited and to occur on an ad hoc basis.  
The ward councillor may be invited to meet with the chief at his great place but there 
seems little genuine attempt by traditional leaders to actively engage with these 
structures unless they are required to.  Thus, whilst civil society and traditional 
leadership structures clearly co-exist at Nyandeni they seem to function largely in 
isolation.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Rockcliff is probably the most successful of the three communities in facilitating 
interaction between civil society actors and traditional authority at the local level.  Local 
farmers‟ associations and the ward councillor have been actively incorporated into a 
hierarchical village system, at the top of which is the Land Use and Development 
Committee (LUDC), chaired by the Headman (Figure 2).  This forum enables 
considerable interaction between the different actors.  Importantly, however, the LUDC 
also provides an effective means of controlling how this interaction takes place at the 
local level.  In contrast to Nyandeni, where farmers groups have representation up to 
local municipal level through LFO, the voice of local producer groups ends with the 
LUDC in Rockcliff.  Even the local ward councillor is obliged to attend this forum so that 
the needs of ward constituents can be made known to traditional leadership before they 
are conveyed to the local municipality.  In effect the LUDC provides a filter for screening 
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local development issues before they can be taken directly to local government and a 
mechanism through which traditional leadership can continue to exercise political 
control.  Moreover, there is no interaction between these different actors when it comes 
to decisions about land allocation and access.  These decisions are ultimately the 
responsibility of the headman alone, unless he refers them to the chief in cases 
involving externally-mediated development.      
 
Thus, irrespective of local arrangements, these findings suggest that traditional leaders 
continue to be the main institutions of authority in the former Transkei, primarily through 
their power to allocate land.  Although civil society organisations co-exist with traditional 
leadership within communities, these play no role in land administration.  Similar 
scenarios are evident in other parts of South Africa, for example, see Oomen (2005) for 
Northern Province (now Limpopo) and Claassens and Hathorn (2008) for the North 
West Province, Mpumalanga and Limpopo Provinces.    
 
4.2. Land rights and agrarian development 
 
It is also important to understand how this institutional layering affects land rights and 
local agrarian development in the former Transkei.  With land access and control 
continuing to fall under the jurisdiction of traditional authorities, how effective are these 
institutions at securing local land rights for residents on an individual and collective 
basis?  The picture is mixed.  Whilst individual rights to cropping and grazing of arable 
plots were relatively secure at Dudumashe and Rockcliff, they were no longer 
enforceable at Nyandeni in the absence of fencing.  Likewise, collective grazing rights 
were also compromised to varying degrees in all three communities through an inability 
to enforce boundaries with neighbouring communities.  Although this was limited in 
extent and frequency of occurrence at Dudumashe and Rockcliff, at Nyandeni it was so 
widespread that the grazing camps effectively constituted an „open access‟ resource 
available to livestock from all surrounding villages.  This lack of centralised control over 
collective grazing of commonage also extended to the recognised grazing rules in effect 
at each community.  Only at Rockcliff was there still an active attempt to employ a 
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system of collective resting and grazing of different camps although it was clear that not 
all individuals adhered to this.  These problems are not unique to the Transkei region.  
Indeed, they have also been well-documented in the former Ciskei where civil society 
institutions such as residents‟ associations or legally constituted CPAs are primarily 
responsible for enforcing collective grazing rights (Ainslie, 1999; Cocks et al., 2001; 
Bennett and Barrett, 2007).  Further afield, in the post-independence resettlement areas 
of Zimbabwe, Kinsey (2005) has documented how civil society institutions have 
struggled to enforce boundaries and regulate use of common pool resources.  Peters 
(2004) has outlined similar struggles in other parts of Africa.   
 
In terms of their involvement with agrarian development and service delivery, it is 
apparent that traditional leaders also have a highly variable role.  Whilst it was clear that 
traditional authorities in the three research sites wanted to be seen to be actively 
facilitating development, the need to engage with civil society structures in order to 
accomplish this effectively limits the role they can play.  The complete disconnect 
between the headman at Dudumashe and the Ward Councillor, means that beyond the 
ILDP, relatively little infrastructural delivery has actually taken place at the village 
despite its relative proximity to local towns and the main, „N2‟ road.  At Nyandeni, the 
well-developed system of farmers‟ associations in conjunction with the ward councillor, 
are actively facilitating infrastructural and agrarian development with seemingly little 
involvement on the part of traditional authorities.  The latter have effectively been 
relegated to the role of figureheads in this process.  They are, however, required to 
provide the necessary approval for any request for land that projects might involve.  
Even at Rockcliff, where the LUDC provides the main forum for bringing together all 
traditional and civil society institutions around service provision, there is a sense that 
this represents another potentially unnecessary layer of bureaucracy in the chain of 
service delivery.  The LUDC attempts to deal with the fundamental problem of overlap 
between traditional and civil institutions in service delivery and in so doing, requires civil 
society actors to present projects that already have community approval to the 
traditional authority with the possibility that they may then need to be referred to the 
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chief for further approval.  In this sense, the LUDC represents an undemocratic, 
intermediate step.  
 
The involvement of multiple layers of traditional authority undoubtedly slows down the 
already convoluted process of service delivery in former bantustans.  The process is 
further confused and slowed by the lack of congruence between tribal authority and 
ward council boundaries, which frequently requires ward councillors to confer with more 
than one traditional leader over service delivery and vice-versa.  There is a clear sense 
that either through their deliberate actions or inadvertently, traditional leaders and the 
traditional authority system over which they preside in the former Transkei may actually 
provide more of a barrier to rural service delivery that a mechanism for its facilitation.   
 
4.3. Legitimacy 
A further key consideration in assessing the long term viability of traditional leaders in a 
democratic nation is their legitimacy.  In analysing this, it is important to examine the 
extent to which this legitimacy is „socially embedded‟ i.e. is derived from the 
communities they purport to represent rather than simply the support of the state 
system (Mamdani, 1996; Cousins, 2007; Ntsebeza 2005).  This research suggests that 
traditional authorities in the Transkei continue to derive their legitimacy primarily from 
their legally enshrined authority over land.  This was apparent from the unequivocal 
position of traditional leaders, in all three communities, regarding their central role in the 
administration of all issues concerning land, irrespective of the emergence of 
democratically elected community representatives such as Ward Councillors.  They 
were all keen to emphasise how this function remained unchanged, was vested in them 
as part of their lineage and could not be challenged.  Similar attitudes were apparent 
amongst traditional leaders in KwaZulu-Natal immediately post-apartheid (McIntosh et 
al., 1996) and more recently in Northern Province (Oomen, 2005).  Ntsebeza (2005) in 
his study of Xhalanga District in the former Transkei, has also suggested that the extent 
to which traditional authorities have been able to claim any legitimacy, since the demise 
of apartheid, has been based on their control over land.  On this basis, it can be argued 
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that the system of „decentralised despotism‟ that characterised local administration 
during apartheid, still persists in the former Transkei.   
 
Nevertheless, there is evidence from the research findings that the „clenched fist‟ of 
traditional rule is not as strong as it was previously, particularly in issues of rule 
enforcement.  This was clearly exemplified at all three communities by the absence of 
an effective system for managing collective grazing as a result of the inability of 
traditional authorities to enforce boundaries and/or a recognised system of rules.  These 
problems stem both from the lack of legitimacy of traditional leaders amongst certain 
sectors of the community and their limited ability to enforce collective rules and norms in 
the absence of the all-encompassing infrastructural, administrative and juristic 
underpinning previously provided by the apartheid state.  In particular, McIntosh et al. 
(1996) highlighted how in KwaZulu-Natal, the diminished strength of magistrates in local 
policy implementation undermined the reach of the state in supporting collective 
management decisions. For rural areas of the former Transkei, this extends to the 
diminished reach of the local services of law enforcement and agricultural extension  
Thus, even though attempts at collective grazing are still made by the traditional leader 
at Rockcliff, the lack of state support in enforcing these decisions, combined with 
inadequate fencing, makes their effective implementation very difficult.   
 
4.4. Shoring up traditional authority through fences 
 
This analysis underlines the increasingly critical role of fencing in grazing management, 
given the diminished ability of traditional leaders to exercise local control.  Under the 
„betterment‟ schemes of apartheid, fencing was key to how traditional leaders controlled 
community grazing (De Wet, 1987; Yawitch, 1988).  It is no surprise therefore, that 
traditional leaders at all three communities made explicit mention of the need for fencing 
when interviewed.  The lack of fencing at Nyandeni and the free-for-all approach to 
grazing this has engendered, has doubtless undermined the legitimacy of traditional 
authority at the community.  Indeed, it appears that individuals (mainly youths) 
sympathetic to a greater role for civil society within the community, have been 
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particularly active in cutting fences in order to hasten this erosion of legitimacy.  In 
contrast, the headman at Dudumashe has used the fencing he has secured as part of 
the ILDP as a means to try and enhance his own legitimacy.  Rather than use it to 
impose a system of rotational resting and grazing as the headman at Rockcliff has, 
which would likely be unpopular, he has instead used the perimeter fencing, in 
conjunction with a ranger, to enforce boundaries with neighbouring communities.  These 
actions and the punitive fines generated from impounding wayward livestock from these 
villages have been used to demonstrate the strength of his leadership and commitment 
to maintaining community integrity in the face of outside pressures.   
 
Such practices are not uncommon in South Africa.  Bennett and Barrett (2007) and 
Bennett et al., (2010) documented how fencing at communities in the former Ciskei 
remains a priority for local leaders, even when attempts at grazing management within 
the community may be ad hoc at best.  Thus, fencing others out as a means of 
legitimising authority appears to not be unique to traditional leaders in the former 
Transkei.  However, the amount of state support directed at fencing projects at 
Dudumashe and more recently to Rockcliff, suggests that the government may well be 
using such „development‟ interventions to indirectly bolster the power of traditional 
leaders in such areas.  Certainly, there are powerful arguments being made for 
government „casting its weight‟ with traditional leaders (Crais, 2006: 735; Ntsebeza, 
2008) and providing fencing which legitimises traditional authority may be one way in 




Related to this question of legitimacy is the degree to which the traditional leaders at the 
communities are accountable to their own people.  Although many of the decisions 
made about control of natural resources (e.g. opening and closing of arable land) or 
development requirements are taken on a collective basis (although the traditional 
leader remains the gatekeeper), there are several important activities that lack any form 
of community input.  For example, there is a clear lack of accountability around the 
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raising of revenue from households in the three research sites.  At Dudumashe the 
headman effectively imposes a monthly „tax‟ on all households in order to ostensibly 
raise money to pay for a ranger.  In reality the revenue generated more than exceeds 
what is required and the excess is used to fund local development projects, something 
which would almost certainly be unnecessary were the headman to allow the ward 
councillor a role in community development.  In effect this represents a continuation of 
the „levies‟ system prevalent under apartheid (Ntsebeza, 2005: 221) and provides a 
means of entrenching the headman‟s own power within the community.  Similarly, at 
Rockcliff, a significant minority of the community are clearly unhappy about the lack of 
community control over the revenue generated from grazing fines.  The fact that most of 
the revenue seems to be directed towards the coffers of the Traditional Leaders‟ 
Council, rather than being invested in community development underlines the 
headman‟s lack of accountability in this respect.  It also highlights the increasing 
requirement for headmen, as middle-ranking traditional leaders, to be upwardly 




This research suggests that in the former Transkei, constructive interaction between 
civil society institutions and traditional authority over issues of involving land remains 
either non-existent or piecemeal at best.  At the three case study communities, land 
rights as expressed through access to and control of land by local people, remain firmly 
under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders.  Nevertheless, it is clear that despite being 
the formal custodians of land on behalf of the people, traditional leaders currently have 
fairly limited success in securing collective rights over resources and in facilitating 
agrarian development.  These shortcomings, combined with their lack of transparency 
and increasingly upward accountability are causing members of their own communities 
to seriously question their legitimacy as socially embedded leaders.   
 
Thus, the issue of how, or even whether traditional authorities can continue to co-exist 
with civil society institutions over the longer term in regions such as the former Transkei 
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remains unresolved.  It is imperative that this is addressed if the potential for even 
greater political schisms within communities and compromised service delivery, as has 
occurred in Zimbabwe (Kinsey, 2005), is to be avoided.  One of the most pressing 
issues is how the twin goals of land administration and local development can be 
effectively combined in institutions that are both streamlined (in terms of process) and 
have widespread social legitimacy.  These findings suggest that a modest starting point 
for South Africa would be if the responsibility for both local land administration and 
development was vested in fully decentralised and downwardly accountable local 
institutions.   
 
Although the debates over the form such institutions should take are still ongoing in 
other parts of Africa (e.g. Alden Wily, 2008; Cotula, 2007; Toulmin, 2008), this research 
suggests that in the communal areas of South Africa, this type of decentralisation 
cannot be achieved in an accountable and effective way where traditional authorities 
continue to be involved.  The lack of compatibility between tradition and modernity is 
also apparent in Ghana, where chiefs continue to exercise power over land with limited 
accountability despite attempts through government policy to make their actions more 
transparent (Ubink and Quan, 2008).  Indeed, Grischow (2008) has suggested that 
chiefs in Ghana are merely using discourses of tradition to protect their economic 
interests in the face of changing circumstances.   
 
Civil society institutions offer an alternative approach and, as this paper illustrates, 
already exist in varying form in the bantustans.  Whilst it is true that early attempts at 
decentralised control over land and development through CPAs have largely failed 
(Lahiff, 2008), it is clear that these interventions mainly focused on land transfers to 
heterogeneous groups and received little institutional support (Cousins and Hornby, 
2002).  Other civil society institutions exist and are clearly active in former bantustans 
such as the Transkei, despite the presence of traditional authorities.  Even though they 
have no role in land administration, farmers‟ associations in villages such as Nyandeni 
are actively involved in local agrarian development.  It would only be a short step to 
create a model similar to that operating in some areas of the former Ciskei (Bennett et 
30 
 
al., 2010) where local enforcement and land administration rests with elected chairmen 
presiding over Residents‟ Associations.  These form an umbrella within which are 
nested farmers‟ associations with a devolved role in the governance of communal land 
and agrarian development and to which ward councillors are affiliated.  In many 
respects this reflects the basic LUDC model of Rockcliff, but with the important 
exceptions that the leader is elected and accountable, no referrals over land allocation 
need be made to higher authority and boundaries of the local authority are 
standardised.  Such an approach is radical and, as Mamdani (1996: 25) has 
emphasised, would require „…dismantling and reorganising the local state‟.  Moreover, 
as underscored by commentators such as Agrawal (2001), Cousins (2007) and Toulmin 
(2008) implementing it will be impossible without the active involvement of the central 
state in providing the necessary legislative and administrative backing to support this 
decentralisation. 
 
Whether such civil society-based models might realistically be extended to the 
remainder of the former bantustan areas is debatable.  Given the political weight 
currently being thrown behind traditional leaders, any approach in which they are 
relegated to effective figureheads in rural affairs is very unlikely to attract high level 
political support.  However, the South African government must consider whether 
aligning itself with unelected traditional authority will really be politically astute in the 
longer term or serve to stifle the expression of democratic freedom and rural 
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Table 1: Key land management and agrarian development roles and institutional 
responsibility at the three research sites. 
 
 COMMUNITIES 





allocation of arable and 
residential land and 
ensuring ongoing 
access to communal 
land. 
Headman (also a Chief) 
responsible for all land 
allocation and 
guaranteeing rights of 
local access.  
Headman (also a deputy 
Chief) responsible for all 
land allocation and ensuring 
rights of access.  Requests 
for land for development 
projects may also need 










communities but no 
institutional control over 
rangeland management 
within fenced camps.  
Control over grazing of 
arable land exercised 
by headman and 
imbizo. 
Little effective fencing 
remains around rangeland 
or arable land.  No attempt 
at control by traditional 
leaders over livestock from 
either Nyandeni or 
neighbouring villages so 
grazing occurs on ‘open-
access’ basis.  Limited 
individual rights over 
arable crop production in 
absence of fenced fields. 
Rangeland boundaries with 
neighbouring communities 
still delineated through 
fencing.  However, attempts 
by headman to impose 
rotational resting and 
grazing within community 
compromised by poor camp 
fencing and unwillingness 
by some to comply. Secure 
individual rights of crop 
production and grazing 




facilitated by headman 
through direct contact 
with municipality.  
Individual producer 




splinter groups engage 
in same role. 
Agricultural development 
appears to have little 
involvement from 
headman.  Rather, 
facilitated by direct 
interaction between 
farmers’ associations and 
producer groups and local 
agricultural office and 
municipality. 
Project ideas articulated by 
local producer groups and 
then presented to Land Use 
and Development 
Committee (LUDC), chaired 
by headman.  LUDC is 
required to approve projects 









ostensibly with ward 
councillor but limited 
provision due to 
intransigence of 
headman. 
Responsibility with ward 
councillor who interacts 
with headman on ad hoc 
basis for approval of land 
allocation or access.  
Responsibility with ward 
councillors but must seek 
approval for projects at local 
level through LUDC before 
presenting to municipality.  
Institutional 
interaction 
Very limited.  Village-
level structures such as 
committee and official 
producer groups 
directly responsible to 
headman.  Splinter 
groups exist outside 
formal system.  Little 
interaction between 
headman and external 
civil society structures, 
e.g. ward councillor. 
Limited interaction 
between headman and 
civil society structures.  
However, complex 
hierarchical layering of 
local producer groups 
feeding into the umbrella 
structure, Libode Farmers’ 
Organisation (LFO), which 
provides forum for 
interaction with Nyandeni 
local municipality. 
Considerable.  LUDC 
provides forum for 
interaction between 
headman and all civil 
society actors at the village 
level around development 
issues.  However, matters 
of local land administration 
dealt with exclusively by 
layers of traditional 
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